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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LDS HOSPITAL, a Division of 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff/ 
Appellant, 
vs. 
JOEL MILLER, MARSHA MILLER, and Case No. 20990 
CAPITOL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants/ 
Respondents. 
INTER-MOUNTAIN CLINIC, INC., 
Plaintiff/ 
Appellant, 
vs. 
JOEL MILLER and CAPITOL 
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants/ 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the 
lower court erred in granting a Summary Judgment to Defendant, 
Capitol Life Insurance Company, and in denying a similar 
Summary Judgment to Plaintiff. Specifically, this case 
involves the interpretation of a clause contained in a health 
and accident policy issued to defendant Marsha Miller, wife of 
Joel Miller. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent concurs with the stipulated Statement of Facts 
contained in the Brief of Appellants. (Appellants1 Brief, pp. 
2-4) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The lower court was correct in finding that the exclu-
sion contained in the health and accident policy was applicable 
to the facts of this case in that the insured/ Joel Miller, was 
injured as a causal result of conduct arising out of a felony. 
2. The language contained in the health and accident 
policy was not ambiguous. While Appellants may concoct con-
flicting constructions of this clause, such concoctions are 
inapplicable to the present situation and are, therefore, 
irrelevant as to any claim of ambiguity. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE 
PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE INTERPRETATION IN 
CONCLUDING THAT THE EXCLUSION IN THIS CASE 
PRECLUDED THE CLAIM OF JOEL MILLER. 
Respondent does not dispute the general principles of law 
enunciated in Appellants' Brief relating to the interpretation 
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of insurance contracts. (Appellants' Brief, pp. 5-11). There 
is no doubt that ambiguous insurance contracts are construed 
against the insurance company and that exceptions to the con-
tract must be proven by the insurance company. Additional 
principles of insurance interpretation should also be noted. 
The rights of the parties rests on the insurance contract as 
written, and courts should not indulge in forced construction 
so as to cast upon the insurance company liability which it has 
not assumed. Kozak v. DAIIE, 262 N.W.2d 904 (Mich. App. 
1977). Unambiguous policy language should be given its plain 
and ordinary meaning. Insurance policies should be read with 
the meaning which ordinary laymen would give to the words. 
Southland Saslor v. Homelife Ins. Co., 416 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 
App. 1982). 
The language contained in Miller's accidental and health 
policy excluded coverage for the commission of certain acts 
which the insurance company declined to insure because of 
public policy reasons. These "unlawful acts" provisions are 
valid and enforceable. As stated by one authority: 
Policies of life and accident insurance often ex-
pressly provide that no recovery shall be had there-
under in case of death or injury while engaged in, or 
in consequence of, a violation of law or the commis-
sion of a crime, or contain some provision covering 
some form of unlawful or wrongful act. Such a provi-
sion is valid and enforceable. In cases arising under 
policies containing a provision limiting, or relieving 
the insurer from liability where the insured was, at 
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the time of his death, committing or participating in 
a felony, it has frequently been held that on the 
basis of the evidence presented recovery on the policy 
was precluded as a matter of law. 43 AM. JUR. 2d 
§580, Insurance, p. 646. 
The lower court correctly applied the principles cited both in 
Appellants' Brief and the additional principles cited herein and 
reached the conclusion that the insurance policy issued by Capitol 
Life Insurance Company did not cover the injuries sustained by Joel 
Miller. The application of these principles will now be discussed 
in relation to the arguments raised by Appellants. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT CAPITOL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
SATISFIED ITS BURDEN OF PROVING THE APPLICA-
BILITY OF THE EXCLUSION CLAUSE AS WELL AS 
THE CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
INSURED'S INJURIES AND THE VIOLATION OF THE 
LAW. 
The policy issued to defendant Miller specifically excluded 
any medical coverage for injuries "arising out of an attempt at 
assault or felony." It is undisputed by the parties that on 
October 23, 1981, defendant Miller killed Robert L. Heinz by 
driving his automobile into Heinz on the freeway. Furthermore, 
it is undisputed that at the time of the accident Miller was 
legally intoxicated. Finally, it is undisputed that Miller 
pleaded guilty to a second degree felony of manslaughter for 
recklessly causing the death of another• 
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Appellants attack the conclusion that since Miller pleaded 
guilty to a felony the exclusion contained in the insurance 
policy was applicable and coverage was therefore properly 
denied, (Appellants' Brief, p. 11). Instead, Appellants rely 
upon a circuitous argument that, while a felony was in fact 
committed, such commission did not cause Miller's injuries. 
(Appellants' Brief, pp. 12-14). The argument advanced by 
Appellants is similar to that used by the National Rifle 
Association by proclaiming "Guns don't kill people, people kill 
people." To sustain the arguments raised by either Appellants 
or the National Rifle Association, it is necessary to discard 
certain facts and causes in order to reach the conclusions 
urged by the various advocates. While the process will allow 
the results claimed it does so only at the loss of a logical 
causal connection which cannot be legitimately eliminated in 
the interpretation of an insurance policy. 
Appellants argue that Miller was injured as a result of an 
automobile collision. At that point in time, according to 
Appellants, no felony had occurred by the mere intoxicated 
driving of Miller and the violent collision with the Heinz 
automobile. The argument then continues, that only after Heinz 
died five minutes after the accident did a felony actually 
arise and, therefore, it cannot be said under any theory that 
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Miller sustained injuries "arising out of" the felonious act. 
(Appellants1 Brief, p. 14). 
Paralleling this argument is a similar one which would be 
advanced by gun advocates. In a barroom brawl one person pulls 
out a .25 caliber pistol and points it at his adversary. He 
pulls the trigger, the gun goes off, a bullet is fired and the 
adversary falls dead from a bullet in the heart. The gun advo-
cate would state that the real cause of death to the adversary 
was not the gun but was the person holding the gun since if he 
had not pulled the trigger the gun would not have gone off. 
Superficially, both of these arguments may make some 
sense. A thoughtful analysis shows that both are equally 
fallacious. In the gun example, it is true that the person 
pulling the trigger initiated the events leading to the adver-
sary's death. Had this person not had a working gun, had the 
person not had proper ammunition, or had the person not aimed 
the gun properly, the mere intent to harm the adversary would 
have resulted in no injury. Thus, no injury occurs whenever a 
person either has an inadequate weapon but has an intent to 
harm, or has a lethal weapon but does not attempt to use it. 
The true causal connection for the adversary's death, there-
fore, requires both a belligerent person and a working weapon. 
Both are the factual cause of the adversary's demise. 
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In the instant case a similar analysis can be made. The 
felony of manslaughter did not factually occur merely because 
Mr. Heinz died. Rather, it occurred because defendant Miller 
reckless collided with Heinz in an automobile thereby causing 
Heinz' death. Both the collision and the death were elements 
causally required in order for a charge of manslaughter to be 
made. It is completely illogical to focus upon the moment of 
Mr. Heinz1 death rather than upon the event which caused the 
death. It was the initial collision in which defendant Miller 
sustained his injuries which proximately caused the death of 
Heinz and the manslaughter charge to be filed. Thus, the true 
focus of inquiry must be the acts giving rise to the moment of 
impact since the collision was the "event" which initiated the 
manslaughter conviction. It is immaterial whether Mr. Heinz 
died at the moment of collision, five minutes after the colli-
sion, or a month after the collision in determining whether 
Miller's injuries arose from a felonious act. Once Mr. Heinz 
died, an otherwise non-felonious collision became felonious and 
the resulting injuries, by definition, had to arise from that 
felony. 
Several other courts have correctly dealt with similar 
cases. In Barker v. California Western States Life Ins., 61 
Cal. Rptr. 595 (Cal. App. 1967), the insured had come from a 
party in which he had been drinking heavily. He was driving 
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his automobile on the wrong side of the freeway when he 
collided with another vehicle. Both the insured and the other 
driver were killed. An autopsy from the insured's body showed 
that he was legally intoxicated at the time of the accident. A 
policy of life insurance on the insured stated that the company 
would not be liable for any loss to which a contributing cause 
was the insured's "commission or attempt to commit a felony." 
The Court of Appeals upheld the finding of the lower court 
which denied coverage to the widow of the insured, based upon 
the exclusionary clause. The Court found that a felony had 
been committed since all of the elements required for a drunk 
driving felony were present -- namely, the driving of a vehicle 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the negligent driv-
ing of the vehicle, and an injury or death to a third person. 
In Mainer v. American Hospital and Life Ins. Co., 371 
S.W.2d 717 (Tex. 1963), the lower court found that the dece-
dent's death had been caused by a head-on collision while the 
decedent was driving on the wrong side of the road while intox-
icated. The court concluded, as a matter of law, that the 
insurer was not prohibited by law from including in its acci-
dental death benefit rider, a limitation of coverage such that 
the accidental death benefit would not be paid where the 
insured died "while committing an assault or felony." The 
limitation was given full effect and the beneficiary was denied 
-8-
recovery. The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas affirmed the 
lower court's decision. 
Appellants rely upon the Colorado Supreme Court case of 
Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 418 P.2d 50 (Colo. 1966), 
in making the causation arguments. This case supports the 
contents now made by Appellants but it is submitted by Respon-
dent that the case is not well-reasoned and should not be 
followed by this Court. The reasoning of the Colorado Supreme 
Court is flawed, much like the previous gun-person example. 
The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that it was the automobile 
accident which killed the insured, not the fact that the auto-
mobile accident was legally termed a felony at the time it 
occurred, since a third person was injured. The Court chose to 
look at the direct cause of the decedent's death, i.e., the car 
collision, rather than to look at the overall picture that the 
car collision was deemed felonious under Colorado law and, 
thus, under the terms of the policy the decedent's death 
directly or indirectly resulted from the commission of a felony. 
The Court of Appeals in California also rejected this type 
of causal reasoning. In Romero v. Volunteer State Life Ins. 
Co., 88 Cal. Rptr. 820 (Cal. App. 1970), the court cited the 
Colorado Supreme Court decision and compared it with the Barker 
decision, supra. The Court of Appeals stated: 
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[The Colorado Supreme Court] reasoning is wholly out 
of harmony with Barker, and accordingly cannot have 
our approval; nevertheless the Colorado decision 
assumes importance here because it emphasizes the fact 
there must be some causal relationship between the 
death of the insured and the commission of the 
felony. Id. at 823. 
In Romero, the insured, while intoxicated, crashed into a 
pillar causing his death within seconds. A short time later a 
second vehicle collided with the wreckage, at which time that 
driver was injured. The California Court of Appeals concluded 
that the death of the decedent could not be deemed to have been 
in connection with a felony since his death preceded any injury 
to another person which was a required element of felony drunk 
driving. In other words, the injury to the second driver was 
too remote in time and in proximate causation to be deemed an 
essential element to the felony drunk driving offense. The 
Court approved, however, the decision in Barker, in which such 
remoteness was not present and the exclusion was held 
applicable. 
A further contrast in interpretation of causation can be 
seen by examining the cited case of Appellants Schwartz v. John 
Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 233 A.2d 416 (N.J. Super. 1967) 
(Appellants' Brief, p. 13), and McDaniel v. Country Life Ins. 
Co., 417 N.E.2d 1087 (111. App. 1981). Both cases involved 
deaths of insureds who were fleeing police officers. Both 
cases involved injuries to passengers who were in the vehicles 
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at the time the chase occurred. Both cases involved similar 
clauses which excluded insurance coverage to an insured whose 
death resulted directly or indirectly from committing a 
felony. The decisions and reasoning of both cases, however, 
are diametrically opposed. 
In Schwartz, the District Judge of New Jersey concluded 
that even though a passenger was injured at the time the 
insured was fleeing from the police, and even though this 
conduct constituted criminal recklessness, which was a felony 
under New Jersey law, a sufficient causation had not been shown 
since it was the accident itself which caused the insured's 
death and not the related injury to the passenger. 
In McDaniel, on the other hand, the Illinois Appellate 
Court denied coverage on the basis that the insured had 
violated two distinct felony provisions. First, he had fled 
from police officers and had caused bodily injury to another 
person. Secondly, he was guilty of criminal recklessness since 
he recklessly caused injury to another person. The court there 
stated: 
Plaintiffs have presented no facts and no reasonable 
inference can be drawn which would indicate that 
Phillip Winkler did anything but knowingly, or 
recklessly, injure his passenger while fleeing an 
officer. It is also a reasonable inference from the 
record that he was guilty of criminal recklessness 
under Indiana law. In either event, he was guilty of 
a felony under those laws. Icl. at 1089-1090. 
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Respondents submit that the analysis of the McDaniel court 
is the correct one to apply in these types of cases. The ques-
tion should not be whether the direct causal injury resulted 
from all the elements of the felony since it may well be that 
the insured is accidentally killed even in the commission of an 
intentional felony. Thus, the direct cause of death should not 
be the focus, but rather, the question should be whether all of 
the elements necessary to constitute a felony are present at 
the time the insured is injured or killed. Thus, in the 
Schwartz case the correct analysis would be to conclude that 
while the insured was causally killed by the automobile colli-
sion the death proximately resulted from the commission of 
criminal recklessness and coverage should have been denied. 
Likewise, in the instant case Mr. Miller was causally 
damaged by the automobile collision and that the collision 
arose out of a manslaughter felony. As long as all the ele-
ments necessary for the establishment of the felony exist and 
as long as there is a proximate causation to the event of that 
felony relating to the injuries or death, then the exclusion 
clause must be applied. 
This principle is further shown in two additional cases. 
In Kaminsky v. Home Life Ins. Co., 258 N.Y.S.2d 266 (App. Div. 
1965) a policy denied coverage to the insured if his death was 
caused either directly or indirectly by the commission of a 
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crime. The insured attempted to choke his wife at which time 
his wife stabbed the insured, causing his death. His wife, in 
seeking coverage, claimed that the stabbing was accidental. 
The court denied coveraged based upon the following reasoning: 
Kaminsky died as the proximate cause of the assault on 
his wife. Whether or not he should have anticipated 
his wife's reaction is not a matter that requires 
trial. Mrs. Kaminsky was clearly being choked to 
death. In these circumstances, regardless of what 
Mr. Kaminsky might have anticipated and, for that 
matter, regardless of Mrs. Kaminsky's intent, the 
insured was engaged in a violent assault which pro-
voked the stabbing, which resulted in his death. Even 
if he had fallen on the knife while struggling with 
his wife, so that his death might have been deemed 
accidental, it would nevertheless have been occasioned 
by his commission of the criminal act of assault. Id. 
at 270. 
In Waters v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 156 F.2d 
470 (10th Cir. 1946), the insurer claimed that it was not lia-
ble for double indemnity benefits under a life policy because 
the provision in that policy relieved the insurer from liabil-
ity for death sustained in the connection with violation of law 
by the insured. Prior to decedent's death, he had been carry-
ing on the illicit manufacture of whiskey. The cause of death 
was electrocution which occurred when he took hold of an elec-
tric light attached to an extension cord in the room which was 
filled with illicit whiskey. Although the court stated that 
for the exclusion to be applicable, the insurer was required to 
prove a causal connection between the violation of the law and 
the insured's death, the court held that a reasonable inference 
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could be drawn from the evidence that there definitely was a 
causal connection between the unlawful operation of the still 
and the accidental death of the insured. The exclusion was 
upheld and the insurer was relieved of liability. 
In conclusion, the reasoning now argued by Appellants 
completely misconstrues the type of causation required in the 
application of this type of clause. The fallacy of Appellants' 
arguments can be seen with the following hypothetical. Assume 
that an insured believes that his neighbor has been having an 
affair with the insured's wife. Assume further that the 
insured confronts the neighbor on his lawn and engages in a 
fistfight. Assume further that under Utah law the fight is a 
simple assault and constitutes only a misdemeanor. Assume, 
however, that as a result of the fight the insured sustains 
injuries and the neighbor sustains injuries which later result 
in the neighbor's death. Finally, assume that the insured is 
charged with manslaughter and is convicted of the second degree 
felony. 
Under Appellants' reasoning the policy provision would not 
apply since Appellants would argue that the death of the neigh-
bor had no causal connection to the injuries sustained by the 
insured in the fight. They would contend that it was merely a 
misdemeanor fight which caused the injuries and that the for-
tuitous death of the neighbor resulting in a felony would not 
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exclude coverage. Such an argument must be logically 
rejected. It is obvious that the insured in such an instance 
was injured as a result of his acts which gave rise to the 
manslaughter felony. Once the neighbor dies as a result of the 
injuries sustained in the fight the clause becomes operative 
since the final element required for a felony has taken place. 
To simply say, as the Appellants have and as the Colorado 
Supreme Court has, that the death of the neighbor has no causal 
connection to the injuries of the insured completely misses the 
intention of these type of clauses as well as misinterprets the 
plain meaning of the English language. 
There is no doubt that in the instance case defendant 
Miller sustained his injuries as a result of the collision 
which ultimately killed Mr. Heinz. Miller's injuries are both 
factually and proximately caused by the manslaughter offense 
and to argue that there is no relationship between the commis-
sion of the felony and his injuries is nonsensical. For these 
reasons the lower court correctly concluded that the exclusion 
clause prevented any recovery by the Appellants for the treat-
ment and care of defendant Miller. 
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POINT III 
THE CLAUSE CONTAINED IN THE CAPITOL LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY POLICY IS NOT AMBIGUOUS 
AND WAS CORRECTLY INTERPRETED BY THE LOWER 
COURT. 
Appellants spend a number of pages in their Brief attempt-
ing to create various ambiguities and inconsistencies in the 
language contained in the insurance policy. While Appellants 
have divided their attack into a number of subdivisions, their 
arguments can be basically summarized under two contentions: 
First, the felony of manslaughter which occurred by reckless 
conduct is not the type of specific intent felony contemplated 
by the insurance policy; secondly, only attempted felonies or 
assaults are encompassed by the policy and since this felony 
was actually committed it was not included. (Appellants' 
Brief, pp. 14-23). 
There is nothing contained in the policy which requires a 
"specific intent" for the "felony" to be excluded. Appellants 
are attempting to insert the word "intentional" felony into the 
meaning of the policy when such word is clearly absent. There 
is no reason for the insurance carrier to exclude a reckless 
felony such as the one involved in this case when the result is 
manslaughter and encompasses the type of behavior which the 
language of the policy is intended to exclude. 
Even the definition of "recklessly" as quoted by the appel-
lants does not support the argument they now make. Recklessly 
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as defined in § 76-2-103(0), UTAH CODE ANN. (1953, as amended), 
is synonymous with "maliciously." The term "malice" is an evil 
intent, a state of mind shown by the intentions to do, or the 
intentional doing of something unlawful. (Webster's New World 
Dictionary, 2d College Ed., 1980). In addition, the Utah 
definition states that the perpetrator is aware of the unjusti-
fiable risk that exists but consciously disregards that risk. 
Contrary to Appellants' assertion, even a reckless act is in 
many degrees "intentional." 
The fact that Joel Miller was intoxicated at the time of 
the commission of the felony is also immaterial to the state of 
mind required. Section 76-2-305, UTAH CODE ANN. (1953, as 
amended) states "a person who is under the influence of volun-
tarily consumed or injected alcohol, controlled substances or 
volatile substances at the time of the alleged offense shall 
not thereby be deemed to be excused from criminal responsibil-
ity." Likewise, § 76-2-306, UTAH CODE ANN. (1953, as amended), 
states the following: 
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense to a 
criminal charge unless such intoxication negates the 
existence of the mental state which is an element of 
the offense; however, if recklessness or criminal 
negligence establishes an element of an offense and 
the actor is unaware of the risk because of voluntary 
intoxication, his unawareness is immaterial in a 
prosecution of that offense. 
Thus, as a matter of law, a person who is intoxicated 
cannot claim that he is unaware of his conduct because of such 
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intoxication. It follows that he must be deemed to have inten-
tionally disregarded the risk by the conduct which he ulti-
mately takes. 
The courts in the previously cited cases have all held that 
felony drunk driving in which a death or serious injury 
occurred is the type of "felony" contemplated in these exclu-
sion clauses. See Mainer, Barker, Romero, supra. Even the 
Supreme Court of Colorado in the Penn Mutual case, upon which 
Appellants rely in their causation argument, rejected the 
notion now argued by Appellants as to the specific intent 
requirement. The Supreme Court of Colorado in that cause 
stated: 
The trial court directed the verdict, however, on the 
ground that the only felony contemplated by the agree-
ment was one in which an insured set out with "the 
intent and purpose of committing a felony. 
It is thereafter concluded that since the particular 
felony involved did not meet this criterion, the 
exclusionary provision could not take effect. For 
reasons hereinafter set forth, we do not agree with 
the basis of the trial court's holding . . . . 
418 P.2d at 51. 
Appellants make the statement that a person reading this 
clause would interpret the word "felony" to include the crimi-
nal element that he was doing something wrong, that he was 
committing a crime; doing something which all laypersons agree 
is evil, bad and not in accordance with the general principles 
of society. (Appellants' Brief, p. 20). It is difficult to 
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understand how, using this criteria, a layperson would not 
conclude that drunk driving resulting in manslaughter would not 
rise to the level of an evil and bad antisocial activity. 
The quotations by Appellants as to the requirement of mens 
rea in our criminal system is completely irrelevant to the 
issue now before this Court. Obviously, the requirement of a 
specific intent is the norm with which criminal law proceeds. 
The Legislature has, however, created a number of crimes which 
are classified as felonies and which do not require a specific 
mens rea because of the seriousness of the conduct taking 
place. For example, § 76-5-207, UTAH CODE ANN. (1953, as 
amended), makes automobile homicide a felony of the third 
degree if criminal negligence can be shown; § 76-6-106, UTAH 
CODE ANN. (1953, as amended), makes criminal mischief a felony 
of the third degree whenever a person recklessly propels an 
object against a motor vehicle whether moving or standing; 
§ 76-7-201, UTAH CODE ANN. (1953, as amended), makes the 
non-support of children a felony of the third degree; and 
§ 76-5-109, UTAH CODE ANN. (1953, as amended), classifies any 
person who inflicts upon a child serious physical injury 
through reckless conduct a perpetrator of a third degree 
felony. Thus, the absence of a mens rea element in a felony 
conviction does not mean that such crime is not of a serious 
consequence which involves a grave evil to society. 
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The Oregon Supreme Court case cited by Appellants in their 
Brief as to the definition of an "accident" is totally irrele-
vant to the discussion concerning felony. Whether this inci-
dent was or was not an "accident" under the insurance policy is 
immaterial since the sole question presented here is whether 
the conduct amounted to a felony. (See Appellants' Brief, pp. 
21-23). 
Finally, Appellants argue that the plain meaning of the 
exclusion encompasses only attempted assaults or attempted 
felonies. (Appellants' Brief, pp. 17-18). The plain meaning 
of the clause "arising out of an attempt at assault or felony" 
is simply that any conduct by the insured will not be covered 
if it arises out of an effort to commit an assault or an effort 
in which a felony has been committed. The phrase "an attempt 
at assault" encompasses those instances where an insured 
attempts to inflict harm upon another but is unsuccessful. 
See, e.g., Bernard v. First National Life Ins. Co., 248 So. 2d 
913 (Fla. 1971); Martin v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 
463 S.W.2d 681 (Pa. 1971); and Quaker City Life Ins. Co. v. 
Futson, 115 S.E.2d 699 (Ga. App. 1960). 
As previously discussed, any conduct which "arises out of a 
felony" is also excluded regardless of whether the felony 
requires a specific mens rea. Furthermore, since attempts to 
commit a felony are themselves felonies, attempted felony 
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actions are also excluded. § 76-4-101, UTAH CODE ANN. (1953, 
as amended). 
The language contained in the insurance policy of this case 
is considerably more liberal than that which has been upheld in 
other cases. For example, many policies preclude recovery when 
the insured has committed a ,,crimeM or has violated the "law." 
See 43 AM. JUR. 2d § 579, Insurance, pp. 646-650; 45 C.J.S. 
§ 785, Insurance, pp. 824-826. Under these provisions even a 
misdemeanor violation has been held to preclude recovery by an 
insured. Thus, the requirement of the policy in this case that 
such exclusion only apply to "felonies" is a fair and equitable 
attempt by the insurance carrier to only exclude reprehensible 
conduct which as a matter of public policy should not be 
financed by other policy holders. 
In conclusion, the language contained in the insurance 
policy issued to defendant Joel Miller is clear and unambig-
uous. While Appellants attempt to construct various degrees of 
interpretation of this language, the facts giving rise to this 
case leave no question but that the manslaughter conviction of 
Miller is the type of "felony" included in the exclusion provi-
sion. Appellants have attempted by the use of contorted lexi-
cology to assert that the reckless and drunk driving of defen-
dant Joel Miller resulting in the death of an innocent motorist 
is somehow not the type of evil conduct excluded by these type 
-21-
of provisions. The lower court was eminently correct in con-
cluding that this clause excluded any coverage for the injuries 
of Miller. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of these types of clauses is to reduce improper 
risks from insurance coverage. It is hardly appropriate for 
policy holders to have to pay premiums to support the medical 
bills of someone who is shot in a bank holdup, injured in a 
barroom brawl, or killed because of their own drunk driving. 
Certainly second degree manslaughter cannot be dismissed as 
extremely serious conduct which should not be covered by insur-
ance benefits. Mr. Miller intentionally became intoxicated, 
intentionally drove an automobile, and unfortunately is now 
suffering both physically and financially as a result of his 
actions. The tragedy to all those involved in this accident 
can never be eliminated regardless of what monetary adjustments 
are made. However, the policyholders of Capitol Life Insurance 
Company should not also be made to suffer by imposing coverage 
for a risk which was clearly excluded by the policy. 
The judgment of the lower court shall be affirmed. 
DATED this 17th day of March, 1986. 
SCM0049X 
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